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ABSTRACT 
The global food crisis of 2007–2008 was characterized by a sharp spike in the prices of most 
commodities, including staple grains. This analysis examines the degree to which changes in world food 
markets influence the price of staple foods in Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis is based on more than 60 
price series from 11 African countries. After examining price trends over 2007–2008, we use an error 
correction model to estimate the degree of price transmission. The results of this analysis indicate the 
following:  
•  Staple food prices in these countries rose 63 percent between mid-2007 and mid-2008, about 
three-quarters of the proportional increase in world prices. 
•  Statistical analysis over 5 to 10 years indicates a long-term relationship with world prices in 
only 13 of the 62 African food prices examined. African rice prices are more closely linked to 
world markets than are maize prices.  
•  The global food crisis was unusual in influencing African food prices, probably because of 
the size of the increase and the fact that it coincided with oil price increases. Policy responses 
and local factors exacerbated the effect in some cases.  
This suggests that African governments can reduce vulnerability to external food price shocks by 
investing in agricultural research, pursuing more predictable policies, facilitating grain trade, and 
promoting diversification in staples consumption. Trade-based food self-sufficiency policies will raise 
food prices but without necessarily reducing price volatility. 
Keywords:  staple food, food prices, price transmission, food crisis, error correction model, Sub-
Saharan Africa vi 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
ADF  Augmented Dickey-Fuller test: statistical test of whether a variable is stationary or non-
stationary 
ADMARC  Agricultural Development and Marketing Corportion: the state-owned agricultural 
marketing board of Malawi 
CIF  cost, insurance, and freight: the cost of traded goods delivered to the port of destination, 
including the cost of sea freight and insurance 
CPI  consumer price index: a number that measures the average price of goods and services in 
a country relative to the average price in some base period, used for calculating the rate 
of inflation  
CV  Coefficient of variation: a measure of variability, calculated as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean. 
ECM  Error correction model: a dynamic econometric model in which deviations from the long-
run pattern influence the short-run changes in the dependent variable.  
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
FOB  free on board: the cost of traded goods at the port of origin, excluding the cost of sea 
freight and insurance 
IFPRI  International Food Policy Research Institute 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
SAFEX  South African Futures Exchange: a commodity exchange based in South Africa that 
organizes trading in futures of agricultural commodities such as maize   
TAR  Treshhold auto-regression model:  a model in which one variable influences another 
variable only if a threshold is passed. 
VECM  Vector error-correction model: an error-correction model involving two or more 
dependent variables that influence each other. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The global food crisis of 2007–2008 was characterized by a dramatic increase in the prices of agricultural 
commodities in international markets. Between January 2007 and March 2008, the food price index of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) rose 61 percent. Staple food crop prices rose even more 
steeply: Over the same period, the prices of wheat and rice doubled, while that of maize increased by 42 
percent. Since then, food prices have declined somewhat, but prices remain significantly higher than the 
average in 2006. For example, the average price of rice in 2009 is 90 percent higher than the average level 
in 2006 (FAO 2009b).  
High world prices were transmitted to domestic markets, eroding the purchasing power of urban 
households and other net buyers of food, forcing them to reduce non-food spending and shift to cheaper 
foods. Poor urban households were particularly affected because they spend a large share of their income 
on food. At the national level, food-importing countries faced balance-of-payment pressure as the cost of 
food imports rose. In addition, the cost of operating food and nutrition programs at the national and 
international levels rose steeply. In dozens of countries, the high prices sparked demonstrations and 
sometimes riots. A number of countries, including Argentina, India, Russia, and Vietnam, responded by 
restricting rice and wheat exports in an attempt to keep domestic prices from rising. Finally, at the 
international level, food aid budgets were stretched, as increased need in developing countries coincided 
with decreased purchasing power of the World Food Programme and other food aid agencies (Benson et 
al. 2008). 
The impact of the global food crisis may have been particularly severe in Sub-Saharan Africa for 
four reasons. First, the region is a net importer of food and agricultural commodities, so higher food 
prices lead to trade imbalances. Second, studies have shown that even in rural areas, a large percentage of 
households are net buyers of staple food crops, so they are hurt by higher food prices. Third, as a 
consequence of the low incomes in the region, food accounts for a large share of household budgets, often 
in the range of 50 to 70 percent. Finally, 34 of the 48 countries in the region are classified as “low 
income” by the World Bank, which limits their capacity to respond to the crisis (World Bank 2008a).  
The goal of this report is to examine the impact of the global food crisis on Sub-Saharan African 
countries. In particular, this paper focuses on the degree to which changes in international grain prices are 
transmitted to domestic food markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. The degree of price transmission will be 
measured in two ways. First, we examine the historical increases in staple food prices in domestic markets 
in Sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2007–2008 and compare them to increases in the world prices for 
the same commodities. Second, we use time-series econometrics to examine the statistical relationship 
between world food prices and domestic food prices in nine African countries over a longer time period, 
at least five years.  
Section 2 provides a descriptive background of the causes and consequences of the global food 
crisis. Section 3 describes in more detail the data and methods used in this study. Section 4 presents the 
results of the analysis, and Section 5 summarizes and provides some discussion of the implications for 
policy and future research. 
 2 
2.  BACKGROUND 
2.1. Trends in International Markets  
As shown in Figure 1, the international prices of cereals and other food commodities rose sharply in 2007 
and early 2008. Between January 2006 and early 2008, the world prices of maize, wheat, and soybeans 
more than doubled, and rice prices tripled. Since mid-2008, food prices have fallen, but most remain 
above the levels of 2006. For example, the prices of rice, maize, and soybean oil in February 2010 were at 
least 50 percent higher than in mid-2006.  
Figure 1. Trends in commodity prices since 2006  
 
Source: IMF 2010. 
Note: 38 API is a measure of the density of the oil, on the scale of the American Petroleum Institute. 
The sharp increases in food prices were catalyzed by various factors, including the rising cost of 
oil, biofuel subsidies in the United States and Europe, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, export 
restrictions by some countries, and the imbalance between rapid growth in global income and slow yield 
growth. Speculation on futures markets has also been blamed for the increases. The relative importance of 
each factor is still debated among economists, but we can draw some preliminary conclusions. 
The price of oil rose from around US$30
1
                                                       
1 All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars. 
 per barrel in 2003 to more than $140 per barrel in July 
2008. This increased food prices by raising the cost of agricultural inputs (particularly fertilizer), 
irrigation, mechanized operations, and transportation. The impact was greatest where agriculture is 
heavily mechanized, including the industrialized countries, and where fertilizers are used intensively, 
including parts of Asia. In addition to increasing the cost of crop production, high oil prices make biofuels 
more profitable, diverting maize and oilseeds from food and feed markets. In 2008, almost 30 percent of 




























































































































































































































Maize, U.S. No 2 yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico
Rice, 5 percent broken, FOB Bangkok
Wheat, U.S. No 1 HRW, FOB Gulf of Mexico
Soybean Oil, Dutch, FOB ex-mill
Oil, Brent, light blend 38 API, FOB U.K.
Food price index (2005=100) (right axis)3 
Advisors and by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimate that the growth of 
biofuel production explains about 33 to 39 percent of the rise in maize prices (Lazear 2008; Rosegrant 
2008). By displacing acreage in wheat and soybeans, the growth in maize production for ethanol 
contributed to tight supplies and price increases in those markets as well. 
Biofuels subsidies have created an additional link between food and fuel prices. Ethanol 
production in the United States is supported by biofuel mandates, a tax on imported ethanol, and a direct 
subsidy.
2
In addition, the U.S. dollar has fallen against the euro and other major currencies, causing the 
dollar-denominated prices of commodities to rise. If commodity prices had remained constant in euro 
terms from January 2006 to mid-2008, the dollar prices would have increased 31 percent. This implies 
that depreciation of the U.S. dollar explains 15 to 27 percent of the increase in dollar-denominated food 
prices over this period.  
 Although some ethanol production would be profitable at current oil prices without these 
policies, the import tariff and subsidies raise ethanol prices and production above what they would 
otherwise be, thus further increasing maize prices. Babcock (2008) estimated that removing all ethanol 
subsidies would reduce maize prices by 13 percent. This would represent roughly one-quarter of the price 
increase over 2007–2008 (Babcock 2008).  
Finally, the trade policies of some major cereals exporters have played a role in the global food 
crisis. In late 2007 and early 2008, a number of exporters responded to rising food prices by restricting 
grain exports to keep prices low within their countries. Rice exports were restricted by Vietnam, India, 
and Egypt, among others, while wheat exports were limited by Argentina, Russia, Kazakhstan, and the 
Ukraine. By further limiting traded supplies, these restrictions have played a major role in the high price 
of rice and, to a lesser degree, wheat (von Braun et al. 2008).  
However, these short-term “headline” causes would not have had the same dramatic effect on 
world markets if we had not experienced a 5- to 10-year period of disequilibrium, in which the growth in 
cereal demand outpaced the growth in cereal production. Cereal demand has been growing at two percent 
per year, thanks to rapid income growth in China, India, and more recently, Sub-Saharan Africa. As 
incomes rise, people diversify their diet and consume more meat and other animal products, increasing 
the demand for feed, particularly maize. Meanwhile, yield growth in these cereals has declined from a 
two to five percent range in the 1970s and 1980s to a range of one to two percent since the mid-1990s 
(World Bank 2008b). This decline can be attributed to the declining public investment in agricultural 
research and development, particularly in staple grains. This imbalance between grain supply and demand 
has been reflected in declining global stocks since 2000. At the beginning of the 2007–2008 crisis, the 
stock-to-use ratio for grains was 14 percent, the lowest ratio since FAO data collection began in 1960 
(Schnepf 2008).  
Many observers have blamed speculation, arguing that investors, looking for high returns, poured 
money into commodity futures markets in expectation of continued price increases, which in turn fueled 
the increase. Some economists are skeptical, however, arguing that these transactions involve offsetting 
purchases and sales, representing a “bet” on the future price without directly affecting the supply or 
demand of the commodity (Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin 2008). Rising futures prices could indirectly affect 
the price if they persuade farmers and processors that the price will rise, inducing them to increase stocks. 
However, as discussed above, grain stocks have been declining in recent years, not growing. Furthermore, 
prices have increased just as rapidly in commodities to which speculators do not have easy access, such as 
rice, durum wheat, edible beans, and fluid milk.
3
If these factors explain the sharp rise in food prices over 2007 and early 2008, what explains the 
partial reversal of this trend since then? First, the agricultural sector responded to the high food prices by 
 To date, the evidence that speculation on futures markets 
contributed to higher prices is weak. 
                                                       
2 The biofuels mandate establishes a minimum level of biofuel production each year, set at nine billion gallons in 2008. The 
tariff on imported ethanol is 54 cents per gallon plus 2.5 percent. The subsidy is in the form of a tax credit worth 51 cents per 
gallon.  
3 Edible beans and durum wheat do not have futures markets. Rice and fluid milk have futures markets, but it is more 
difficult to speculate in these commodities because they are not included in the main commodity indexes.  4 
expanding output. The global cereal harvest in 2008 was a record 2.3 billion tons, seven percent higher 
than the 2007 cereal harvest (FAO 2009a). Second, the price of oil peaked at around $140 per barrel in 
June and July 2008 and began to fall sharply in August as the global recession dampened the demand. By 
the end of that year, oil had fallen to $41 per barrel, reducing the demand for ethanol and other biofuels. 
Third, grain-exporting countries removed or relaxed their export restrictions. As a result, the international 
price of wheat began to decline in April 2008, rice in June, and maize in July.  
It may be premature to declare the global food crisis over, however. The average prices of maize, 
soybeans, and rice in early 2010 are still 48 to 92 percent higher than in mid-2006, in spite of the global 
recession. Furthermore, oil prices have rebounded to around $75 per barrel. As the global economy 
emerges from recession, we can expect the demand for oil to rise rapidly and the demand for food to rise 
more modestly, both of which will contribute to higher food prices.  
2.2. Transmission of World Prices to Domestic Markets  
The first objective of this report is to measure the degree to which changes in world food prices are 
transmitted to domestic markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fluctuations in world food prices will affect 
people in developing countries only if the price changes are transmitted to domestic markets in those 
countries. In this section we provide a conceptual framework of the conditions under which world prices 
are transmitted to local markets and a summary of previous work on this topic. This background will be 
useful in interpreting the results of the analysis of price transmission from world markets to markets in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which will be presented in Section 4.  
Conceptual Framework 
Price transmission refers to the effect of prices in one market on prices in another market. It is generally 
measured in terms of the transmission elasticity, defined as the percentage change in the price in one 
market given a one percent change in the price in another market. Although the markets could be for 
related commodities (such as maize and soybeans) or for products at different points in the supply chain 
(for example, wheat and bread), we focus on the case of markets for the same commodity in two 
locations. We start with the simple case in which markets are perfectly competitive: 
•  The product is homogeneous, meaning there is no variation in quality;  
•  Traders are numerous and small so that none of them has market power; 
•  Traders have perfect information;  
•  Trading occurs instantly;  
•  There are no trade taxes or other policy barriers to trade; and 
•  There are no transportation or transaction costs. 
In this case, spatial arbitrage would ensure that the price of a commodity is the same in all 
markets. If the price in market A (PA) exceeded the price in market B (PB), it would be profitable to ship 
the product from market B to market A until the prices were equal again. Price transmission would be 
“perfect” in that any price change in one market would be quickly reflected in an equivalent change in 
other markets. In other words, the transmission elasticity would be 1.0.  
In real life, of course, these assumptions often do not hold which reduces or slows the 
transmission of prices from one market to another. Below, we explore the implications of relaxing each of 
these assumptions.  
Homogeneous product: If local and imported goods are considered the same by consumers 
(perfect substitutes), it is not possible for a vendor to charge different prices depending on the origin of 
the product, so the prices of local and imported goods will be the same. Often, however, there are 
perceived quality differences between commodities produced in different locations. If so, local and 
imported goods may be imperfect substitutes and the prices will differ between them. Furthermore, the 
prices will move together to some degree, but price transmission will not be perfect.  5 
Small and numerous traders: If a small number of traders dominate the market, they may be able 
to exert market power. For example, if the import market is dominated by a few large traders, they may be 
quick to transmit price increases in world markets but slow to pass on price reductions. 
Perfect information: If traders do not have up-to-date information about prices in other markets, 
they cannot respond quickly to profitable opportunities. This will impede the process of spatial arbitrage 
that transmits price changes from one market to another.  
Trading occurs instantly: In practice, it often takes more than a month from the time a trader 
decides to import grain from overseas to the availability of the imported commodity in domestic markets, 
particularly in landlocked countries. Because of this, the process of spatial arbitrage can be slow and price 
differences may persist over time before being corrected.  
No policy barriers to trade: Government restrictions on internal trade are no longer prevalent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but restrictions on international trade are common. Tariffs increase the cost of 
transporting goods across national borders, but they do not reduce price transmission unless they choke 
off all trade in the commodity. Quantitative barriers, if binding, will break the transmission of prices from 
one market to another. If government licenses are required to trade or if there are obstacles to purchasing 
foreign exchange, trader response to changes in international prices may be delayed or blocked entirely by 
administrative procedures, resulting in imperfect price transmission. Finally, sporadic intervention by the 
government to close borders, undertake government-sponsored imports, or change trade policy can 
greatly increase the commercial risk in international trade. This will discourage traders from participating 
in international trade, raise the risk premium associated with trade, and reduce price transmission. 
No transportation or transaction costs: Transportation costs are a major factor in trade, 
particularly for staple foodcrops. A low value-to-bulk ratio
4
If the difference between the autarky price in market A (PA
a) and in market B (PB
a) is greater than 
the full cost of transportation between the two markets (c), including taxes, risk premiums, and normal 
profits, then trade will be profitable. In other words, if  
 implies that transportation costs are large 
relative to the cost of the product. For imported grain crops in Sub-Saharan Africa, the cost of sea freight 
and overland transportation may represent more than half the final price. How does this affect spatial 
arbitrage and price transmission? It depends on the autarky price in each market, that is, the prices that 
would prevail in the absence of trade.  
  𝑃𝐵
𝑎 − 𝑃 𝐴
𝑎 >  𝑐,  (1) 
then it will be profitable to ship the commodity from market A to market B. Trade will reduce the supply 
and raise the price in the exporting market (market A) and increase the supply and reduce the price in the 
importing market (market B), thus causing the prices in the two markets (PA and PB) to move toward each 
other. Equilibrium is reached when 
  𝑃𝐵 − 𝑃 𝐴 =  𝑐,  (2) 
Where: 
  𝑃𝐵 ≤ 𝑃𝐵
𝑎 and 𝑃 𝐴 ≥ 𝑃 𝐴
𝑎.  (3) 
In this situation, any small change in the price in one market would be reflected in an equivalent change 
in the price in the other market. This implies that prices would move together.  
Even if the absolute difference between two prices remains constant, however, this does not 
imply a transmission elasticity of 1.0. This is because if two prices change by the same absolute amount, 
the percentage increase will be greater for the lower of the two prices. For example, if the world price of 
rice is $300 per ton and the domestic price of rice in Ghana is $600 per ton, and a $60 per ton increase in 
                                                       
4 The value-to-bulk ratio can be defined in terms of the monetary value per ton or the monetary value per cubic meter of the 
product. Since transportation costs are generally proportional to bulk (weight, volume, or both), the cost of transporting will be a 
larger percentage of the final value for a good with a low value-to-bulk ratio (such as maize) than for a good with a high value-to-
bulk ratio (such manufactured goods). 6 
the world price results in a $60 per ton increase in the local price, the elasticity of price transmission from 
the world price to the domestic price would be 0.5.
5
On the other hand, if the difference between the autarky price in market A and in market B is less 
than the full cost of transportation, then it is not profitable to trade between the two regions. Trade will 
remain unprofitable if prices remain in the following ranges: 
 Conversely, for an export commodity where the 
domestic price is lower than the world price, the transmission elasticity could be greater than 1.0.  
  𝑃 𝐴 + 𝑐 > 𝑃𝐵 > 𝑃 𝐴 − 𝑐   ,  (4) 
which implies that 
  𝑃𝐵 + 𝑐 > 𝑃 𝐴 > 𝑃𝐵 − 𝑐   .  (5) 
In this simple two-region, one-commodity model, as long as there is no trade, there will be no 
price transmission.
6
If the direction of trade between the two markets reverses on a regular basis, price transmission 
will be imperfect. Trade reversals are not uncommon in agricultural markets because the supply of most 
crops is seasonal, so a region may export a crop during its harvest season and import it during the off-
season. When the good is being transported from A to B, the price in market B will be greater, and when 
the flow is reversed, the price in market A will be greater. In this case, the relationship between the two 
prices may not be obvious, even if there is regular trade between the two markets.  
 If the cost of transportation (c) is large, this will create a large band within which 
each price can fluctuate without inducing trade and reconnecting the two prices. The full cost of 
transportation will be greater if (1) the distance between the two markets is great, (2) transportation 
infrastructure is poor, (3) tariffs and other trade taxes are high, (4) trading is particularly risky, or (5) 
some combination of these factors is in play.  
Until this point, we have assumed that market A and market B are symmetric, in that each market 
influences prices in the other market. However, in the relationship between world market prices and 
domestic prices in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a large difference in scale. We can usually adopt the 
“small country assumption” that domestic prices will not have a noticeable effect on world commodity 
prices, but world prices can influence domestic prices. For example, Côte d’Ivoire is one of the larger rice 
importers in Sub-Saharan Africa, but its imports of 10,000 tons per year represent just 0.04 percent of the 
25 million tons of rice traded on world markets. Thus, it is unlikely that changes in Ivorian prices or 
import volumes will have any measurable impact on world rice prices. Similarly, although South Africa 
exported 1.0 million tons of maize in 2006, this was barely 1 percent of the 95 million tons of maize 
traded globally that year (FAO 2009a).  
Thus, in the absence of trade barriers, world food prices establish upper and lower bounds for 
domestic food prices: 
  𝑃𝑊 + 𝑐 ≥ 𝑃 𝐴 ≥ 𝑃𝑊 − 𝑐   ,  (6) 
where PW is the world price, PA is the wholesale price in an African city, and c is the full cost of 
transportation between the world market and the domestic market. In this equation, PW + c is the import 
parity price, the full cost of importing the commodity from world markets. Similarly, PW - c is the export 
parity price, the net price of exporting at the world price after deducting transportation costs. As described 
above, a large transportation cost (c) implies a large band around the world price within which the 
domestic price may vary with no international trade and hence no price transmission. We expect price 
transmission to be higher when the domestic price is near the import parity price, implying at least 
occasional imports, or when the domestic price is near the export parity price, implying at least occasional 
exports. We expect little or no price transmission when the domestic price is well within the bounds set 
by the import parity and export parity prices. We also expect more limited price transmission when there 
                                                       
5 The elasticity is calculated as follows: (60/600)/(60/300) = 0.5. 
6 In a multiple-commodity system, price transmission may occur through a substitute commodity that is traded, even if the 
commodity in question is not.  7 
are policy barriers to international trade, lack of market information, or uncompetitive markets.  
Previous Research on Price Transmission 
Research on price transmission has been motivated largely by the belief that co-movement of prices in 
different markets can be interpreted as a sign of efficient, competitive markets, while lack of co-
movement is an indication of market failures, including lack of information, poor infrastructure, or 
uncompetitive markets. A large number of studies examine the degree of price transmission between 
markets within a country, including several for Sub-Saharan Africa (see Abdulai 2000 for Ghana; Rashid 
2004 for Uganda; Lutz, Kuiper, and van Tilburg 2006 for Benin; Negassa and Myers 2007 for Ethiopia; 
Van Campenhout 2007 for Tanzania; Myers 2008 for Malawi; and Moser, Barrett, and Minten 2009 for 
Madagascar). Here, we focus on methodological advances and the empirical studies that examine the 
transmission of prices from the world market to domestic African markets.  
Early studies of price transmission used simple correlation coefficients of contemporaneous 
prices. A high correlation coefficient is evidence of co-movement and was often interpreted as a sign of 
an efficient market. Another early approach was to use regression analysis on contemporaneous prices, 
with the regression coefficient being a measure of the co-movement of prices. For example, Mundlak and 
Larson (1992) estimated the transmission of world food prices to domestic prices in 58 countries using 
annual price data from the FAO. They found very high rates of price transmission: The median elasticity 
of transmission was 0.95, implying that 95 percent of any change in world markets was transmitted to 
domestic markets.  
The static regression approach has been criticized for assuming instantaneous response in each 
market to changes in other markets. In fact, there is generally a lag between the price change in one 
market and the impact on another market due to the time it takes traders to notice the change and respond 
to it. A change in world prices may take more than a month to be reflected in domestic prices. These 
dynamic effects can be captured by including lagged world prices as explanatory variables in the 
regression analysis (Ravallion 1986).  
In the 1980s, researchers became aware of the problem of nonstationarity. Standard regression 
analysis assumes that the mean and variance of the variables are constant over time. This implies that the 
variable tends to return toward its mean value, so the best estimate of the future value of a variable is its 
mean value. However, in the analysis of time-series data, prices and many other variables are often 
nonstationary, meaning that they drift randomly rather than tending to return to a mean value. One 
implication of this “random walk” behavior is that the best estimate of the future price is the current price. 
When standard regression analysis is carried out with nonstationary variables, the estimated coefficients 
are unbiased but the distribution of the error is non-normal, so the usual tests of statistical significance are 
invalid. In fact, with a large enough sample, any pair of nonstationary variables will appear to have a 
statistically significant relationship, even if they are actually unrelated to each other (Granger and 
Newbold 1974; Phillips 1987).  
However, the first difference (Δx = xt - xt-1) of a nonstationary variable may be stationary. If so, 
the original variable (xt) is said to be integrated to degree 1 or I (1). Because the first difference is 
stationary, it can be estimated econometrically without the problems described above. Furthermore, two 
nonstationary variables may be related to each other by a long-term relationship even if they diverge in 
the short run. If two nonstationary variables move together in the long run, they are said to be 
cointegrated.
7
Using an inappropriate method can have dramatic effects on the results. For example, Quiroz and 
Soto (1995) repeated the analysis of Mundlak and Larson (1992) with similar data but using the error 
correction model. Where Mundlak and Larson found an average of 95 percent price transmission, Quiroz 
 In this case, an error correction model (ECM) is appropriate to deal with the problems of 
dynamic effects and nonstationarity, as discussed below (Engle and Granger 1987). 
                                                       
7 In technical terms, cointegration refers to the situation in which a linear combination of nonstationary variables yields a 
stationary variable, for example PA - βPB = ε, where PA and PB are nonstationary variables, β is a coefficient, and ε is a stationary 
error term.  8 
and Soto found no relationship between domestic and international prices for 30 of the 78 countries 
examined. Even in countries with a relationship, the convergence was very slow in many of them.  
Conforti (2004) examined price transmission in 16 countries, including 3 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
using the error correction model. In Ethiopia, he found statistically significant long-run relationships 
between world and local prices in four out of seven cases, including retail prices of wheat, sorghum, and 
maize. In Ghana, there was a long-run relationship between international and local wheat prices but no 
such relationship for maize and sorghum. And in Senegal, he found a long-run relationship in the case of 
rice but not maize. In general, the degree of price transmission in the Sub-Saharan African countries was 
less than in the Asian and Latin-American countries.  
Even statistical models that take nonstationarity into account face another problem. The lack of 
price integration does not necessarily imply inefficient markets or policy barriers to trade. As pointed out 
by Harriss (1979), Baulch (1997), and Barrett and Li (2002), transport costs create a range over which a 
given price is not affected by the price in another market. For example, if the domestic price lies between 
the import parity price and the export parity price, it will not show any co-movement with international 
prices even if markets are efficient and there are no policy barriers to trade. One econometric approach to 
deal with this situation is threshold autoregressive (TAR) models (Balke and Fomby 1997; Hansen and 
Seo 2002). In one version of these models, two variables have no relationship with each other when the 
difference between them is below a certain threshold, but they become linked when the difference 
exceeds that threshold (Van Campenhout 2007; Myers 2008).  
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3.  DATA AND METHODS 
This analysis uses monthly data on prices in international markets and nine Sub-Saharan African 
countries to examine the transmission of world prices to domestic markets in the region. The data and 
methods for this component of the analysis are described in sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.  
3.1. Price Data  
The descriptive analysis of price trends over 2007–2008 uses 83 monthly price series for staple foodcrops 
from 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, compiled by FAO (2009b). These prices have already been 
converted to U.S. dollars per ton.  
The econometric analysis of price transmission uses a somewhat smaller set of staple food prices 
because the analysis requires a longer series of continuous monthly data. For this analysis, we use the 
international prices shown in Table A.1and 62 price series from nine Sub-Saharan African countries 
shown in Table A.2. (both tables are in Appendix A). The selection of data followed certain criteria to 
ensure quality and minimum sample size. In particular, each price series came from a single source (we 
did not combine data from multiple sources for an individual price series). In addition, we limited 
ourselves to prices series that included at least 40 months of data. Third, we did not use any series that 
had more than two missing values in a row. Individual missing values were filled in using linear 
interpolation. 
In addition, exchange rates for each of the nine African countries were obtained from the 
international financial statistics database maintained by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2009). The 
IMF exchange rates were used to convert all African prices to current U.S. dollar prices. The U.S. dollar 
equivalent of the African domestic prices and the U.S. dollar world prices were converted to real U.S. 
dollars at 2008 prices using the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  
3.2. Analysis of Price Transmission 
This study uses the vector error correction model (VECM) to examine the relationship between world 
food prices and domestic food prices in African countries. Each estimated model consists of a domestic 
price for one commodity in one market in Sub-Saharan Africa and the world market price for the same 
commodity. The VECM is appropriate if two conditions are met: 
1.  Each variable is nonstationary and integrated to degree 1, written as I(1). This means that the 
variable follows a random walk, but the first difference (Xt - Xt-1) is stationary, written as 
I(0).  
2.  The variables are cointegrated, meaning that there is a linear combination of the variables that 
is stationary. We are analyzing two prices at a time, so that the cointegrating equation would 
take the form of P1 = α + βP2 + ε or P1 - α- βP2 = ε , where ε is stationary.  
For each pair of domestic and world prices, the analysis consists of three steps: 
1.  We test the price variables individually to see if they are I(1). This is done with the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test.  
2.  We use the Johansen test to determine whether the two series are cointegrated, meaning that each 
variable is I(1) and a linear combination of the two variables is I(0). In terms of our analysis, this 
tests whether there is a long-run relationship between the domestic price and the corresponding 
world price.  
3.  If the Johansen test indicates that there is a long-run relationship between the two variables, then 
we estimate the VECM. The model takes the following general form:  
    (7) 10 
where   pt is an n x 1 vector of n price variables; 
  Δ is the difference operator, so Δpt = pt – pt-1;  
  εt is an n x 1 vector of error terms;  
α is an n x 1 vector of estimated parameters that describe the trend component; 
Π is an n x n matrix of estimated parameters that describe the long-term relationship and 
the error correction adjustment; and  
Γk is a set of n x n matrices of estimated parameters that describe the short-run 
relationship between prices, one for each of q lags included in the model.  
The VECM tests for the effect of each variable on each other variable. In the context of this 
study, the two-variable VECM tests the effect of world prices on domestic prices as well as the effect of 
domestic prices on world prices. Since most countries (and all Sub-Saharan African countries) may be 
considered “small countries” in the staple foodcrop markets, there is little value in testing the effect of 
domestic prices on world prices. In addition, tests indicate that one lagged term is generally sufficient. For 
our purposes, then, we are interested in only one portion of the VECM. This portion can be simplified as 
follows: 
  Δpt
d = 𝗼 + 𝜃�𝑝𝑡−1
𝑑  − 𝗽𝑝𝑡−1
𝑤 � + 𝗿Δpt−1
w + 𝜌∆𝑝𝑡−1
𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡,  (8) 
where     pt
d is the log of domestic price converted to real U.S. dollars;  
pt
w is the log of world price of the same commodity in real U.S. dollars; 
Δ is the difference operator, so Δpt = pt – pt-1; 
α, θ, β, δ, and ρ are estimated parameters; and 
εt is the error term. 
As described above, if the original price series are I(1), then the first differences (Δp) will be 
stationary, or I(0). The coefficients in the error correction model can be interpreted as follows:  
1.  Since the prices are expressed in logarithms, the cointegration factor (β) is the long-run 
elasticity of the domestic price with respect to the international price. Thus, β is the long-run 
elasticity of price transmission. The expected value for imported commodities is 1 > β > 0, 
but for exports, it may be greater than 1. Thus, if β = 0.5, this implies that 50 percent of the 
proportional change in the international price will be transmitted to the domestic price in the 
long run. 
2.  The error correction coefficient (θ) reflects the speed of adjustment. We expect it to fall in the 
range of -1 < θ < 0. The term in parentheses represents the deviation or “error” between the 
prices in the previous period and the long-run relationship between the two prices. If the error 
is positive (the domestic price is too high given the long-term relationship), then the negative 
value of θ helps “correct” the error by making it more likely that the Δp
d
t is negative. The 
larger θ is in absolute value (that is, the closer to -1), the more quickly the domestic price (p
d) 
will return to the value consistent with its long-run relationship to the world price (p
w).  
3.  The coefficient on change in the world price (δ) is the short-run elasticity of the domestic 
price relative to the world price. In this case, it represents the percentage adjustment of 
domestic price one period after a one percent shock in international price. The expected value 
is 0 < δ < β. 
4.  The coefficient on the lagged change in the domestic price (ρ) is the autoregressive term, 
reflecting the effect of each change in the domestic price on the change in domestic price in 
the next period. The expected value is -1 < ρ < 1.  
Testing for Granger causality plays an important part in many vector error correction models, but 
it is less important when examining the transmission of international prices to domestic prices. This is 
because causality from domestic to international prices is implausible.  11 
4.  RESULTS 
The results are divided into two parts. Section 4.1 examines the trends in 83 staple food prices in 12 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa during the global food crisis of 2007–2008. Section 4.2 uses time-series 
econometrics to analyze the relationship between domestic and international prices in the longer term for 
62 prices in 9 African countries.  
4.1. Trends in Staple Food Prices in Sub-Saharan Africa  
In this section, we examine the change in staple food prices (converted to U.S. dollars) between June 
2007 and June 2008 for 83 prices across 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. We use this 
time period because it represents the period of rapid growth in world food prices. The international price 
of maize peaked in June 2008, rice in May 2008, and wheat in March 2008.
8
Table 1 shows the change in staple food prices in 22 markets of eastern Africa. The African price 
increases are measured in U.S. dollars in order to adjust for domestic inflation and allow comparison with 
the increase in international prices. The first column of figures indicates that food prices in eastern Africa 
have increased significantly during this period. The average increase in dollar terms was 76 percent, but 
there is a wide range across countries. In Ethiopia, food price increases were particularly high, ranging 
from 83 percent to 184 percent across the 6 markets. Food price increases were somewhat lower in the 
other countries. The range is from 19 percent to 100 percent, but most of the increases are between 40 
percent and 65 percent.  
  
The second column of figures indicates the change in domestic prices as a percentage of the 
change in the corresponding international prices. Thus, 100 percent would indicate that domestic and 
international prices changed in the same proportion between June 2007 and June 2008. For maize, rice, 
and wheat, there are corresponding international prices. For beans and teff, we compare the domestic 
price increase to the simple average increase in the international prices of maize, rice, and wheat.  
Table 1 indicates that Ethiopian food prices increased more rapidly than world food prices over 
the reference period. Since there is very little commercial trade in the main staple grains in Ethiopia, it is 
difficult to understand how international food prices would be directly transmitted to local markets. One 
possible explanation is that Ethiopia has experienced rising inflation in the past two years. Although this 
would normally be accompanied by a depreciation of the currency, the government has imposed 
restrictions on imports and on the purchase of foreign exchange, thus suppressing the depreciation. From 
June 2007 to June 2008, domestic prices rose about 70 percent but the exchange rate remained essentially 
unchanged. In addition, a supply shock may have contributed to higher real prices (see World Bank, 
2007; and Loening, Durevall, and Birru 2008). 
   
                                                       
8 These world prices refer to U.S. No 2 yellow maize FOB Gulf of Mexico, Thai Super A1 broken white rice FOB Bangkok, 
and U.S. No 2 hard red winter wheat FOB Gulf of Mexico. 12 
Table 1. Changes in eastern African food prices from June 2007 to June 2008 




converted to US$ 
Increase in domestic 
price as a pct of the 
increase in world price 
Ethiopia  Addis Addis  Maize  Wholesale  184%  236% 
Addis Addis  Teff  Wholesale  100%  111% 
Addis Addis  Wheat  Wholesale  83%  141% 
Addis Addis  White sorghum  Wholesale  121%  175% 
Jimma  Wheat  Wholesale  92%  156% 
Mekele  Wheat  Wholesale  132%  224% 
Kenya  Busia  Beans  Wholesale  100%  112% 
Busia  Maize  Wholesale  62%  80% 
Eldoret  Beans  Wholesale  23%  26% 
Eldoret  Maize  Wholesale  55%  71% 
Kisumu  Beans  Wholesale  19%  21% 
Kisumu  Maize  Wholesale  56%  71% 
Mombasa  Beans  Wholesale  54%  60% 
Mombasa  Maize  Wholesale  74%  95% 
Nairobi  Beans  Wholesale  54%  60% 
Nairobi  Maize  Wholesale  71%  91% 
Rwanda  Kigali  Beans  Wholesale  36%  40% 
Kigali  Maize  Wholesale  63%  81% 
Kigali  Rice  Wholesale  64%  42% 
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam  Beans  Wholesale  54%  60% 
Dar es Salaam  Maize  Wholesale  99%  127% 
Dar es Salaam  Rice  Wholesale  71%  47% 
Average        76%  97% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on price data from FAO (2009b and 2009c).      
Note:  For teff and beans, the last column compares the domestic price increase to the average increase in the world price of 
maize, rice, and wheat over the same time period. 
In the other eastern African countries, the proportional change in domestic prices was less than 
the proportional change in the corresponding international price. The percentages appear to be lower for 
beans than for maize and rice, perhaps reflecting the fact that beans are a nontradable commodity. 
Food prices followed a similar pattern in southern Africa (see Table 2). Across the 21 prices 
examined, the average increase (in dollar terms) between June 2007 and June 2008 was 107 percent. The 
highest price increases were in Malawi: Six of the nine prices examined in the country increased by more 
than 150 percent. Cassava and rice prices seemed to rise less than maize prices. In Mzuzu, the main 
market in the cassava-growing region of Malawi, cassava prices actually decreased over the year.  
In Mozambique and Zambia, staple food prices increased 40 to 60 percent, significantly less than 
in Malawi. This difference is somewhat surprising given that Malawi lies between the other two 
countries, so one would expect co-movement of prices in the three countries, at least for markets near the 
borders. In the second quarter of 2008, responding to the high food prices, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania 
all banned the export of maize (Banda 2008), which would delink prices in neighboring countries.  
The smallest price increases, however, were in South Africa. Yellow and white maize prices rose 
less than 10 percent in dollar terms between June 2007 and June 2008, while wheat prices increased just 
32 percent. There were no unusual movements in the rand-dollar exchange rate that would explain this 13 
low rate of increase in food prices. South Africa is a major regional exporter of maize, exporting 470,000 
tons of maize in 2007–2008. It is not clear why South African maize and wheat prices remained so stable 
during this period, though export restrictions would help to explain this pattern.  
Table 2. Changes in southern African food prices from June 2007 to June 2008 




converted to US$ 
Increase in domestic 
price as a pct of the 
increase in world price 
Malawi  Lilongwe  Maize  Retail  171%  219% 
Lilongwe  Rice  Retail  53%  35% 
Liwonde  Maize  Retail  164%  210% 
Lizulu  Maize  Retail  244%  313% 
Mzimba  Maize  Retail  174%  223% 
Mzuzu  Cassava  Retail  -2%  -2% 
Mzuzu  Maize  Retail  156%  200% 
Mzuzu  Rice  Retail  29%  19% 
Nsanje  Maize  Retail  159%  203% 
Mozambique  Maputo  Maize  Retail  62%  79% 
Maputo  Rice  Retail  54%  35% 
Nampula  Cassava  Retail  36%  40% 
Nampula  Maize  Retail  123%  158% 
South Africa  Johannesburg  Wheat  Wholesale  32%  54% 
Johannesburg  White maize  Wholesale  7%  9% 
Johannesburg  Yellow maize  Wholesale  9%  12% 
Zambia  National avg  Maize  Retail  57%  73% 
National avg  Maize flour  Retail  56%  72% 
National avg  Wheat flour  Retail  43%  73% 
Average        86%  107% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on price data from FAO (2009b and 2009c). 
Note:  For cassava, the last column compares the domestic price increase to the average increase in the world price of maize, rice, 
and wheat over the same time period. 
In western Africa, the food prices appear to have increased somewhat less than in southern and 
eastern Africa (see Table 3). Across the 42 prices examined, the average increase over the period from 
June 2007 to June 2008 was 42 percent, compared to 76 percent in eastern Africa and 86 percent in 
southern Africa. Although the number of cases is too small to draw firm conclusions, the price increases 
for cassava, plantains, and beans are generally low, less than 15 percent. In contrast, the price increases 
for rice and maize tend to be in the range of 40 to 80 percent. The results show some interesting contrasts. 
For example, the price of rice increased just 4 percent in Accra (Ghana) but rose 132 percent in Dakar 
(Senegal). Similarly, maize prices increased more than 80 percent in Accra but less than 20 percent in 
several markets in Cameroon. Rice is imported in significant volumes by most western African countries, 
so it is likely that differences in import policy play an important role in the variation in rice price trends 
across the region. Maize imports tend to be small relative to domestic production, so variation in domestic 
production would contribute to differences in maize price trends. In addition, several western African 
countries imposed grain export bans, which raised prices in landlocked countries and caused differences 
in price trends across countries (Staatz et al. 2008). 
The last column of figures shows the increase in domestic prices as a percentage of the increase 
in world prices. On average, the increase in domestic prices was 42 percent of the increase in the 14 
corresponding world prices. In most cases, the percentage was less than 60 percent. One notable 
exception is the price of maize in Accra, which was slightly greater (105 percent) than the increase in 
maize prices on the world market over the same period.  
Table 3. Changes in western African food prices from June 2007 to June 2008 




converted to US$ 
Increase in domestic price 
as a pct of the increase in 
world price 
Cameroon    Bafoussam  Cassava  Retail  3%  3% 
    Bafoussam  Maize  Retail  10% 
 
13% 
    Bafoussam  Plantains  Retail  4%  4% 
    Bafoussam  Red beans  Retail  11%  12% 
    Bafoussam  Rice  Retail  63%  41% 
    Bafoussam  Wheat flour  Retail  46%  78% 
    Bamenda  Maize  Retail  15%  19% 
    Bamenda  Rice  Retail  92%  60% 
    Doula  Maize  Retail  35%  45% 
    Doula  Rice  Retail  51%  33% 
    Garoua  Maize  Retail  54%  70% 
    Garoua  Rice  Retail  46%  30% 
    Yaounde  Cassava  Retail  14%  16% 
    Yaounde  Maize  Retail  22%  29% 
    Yaounde  Plantains  Retail  13%  14% 
    Yaounde  Red beans  Retail  15%  17% 
    Yaounde  Rice  Retail  54%  36% 
    Yaounde  White flour  Retail  30%  51% 
Ghana  Accra  Cassava  Retail  8%  9% 
Accra  Maize  Retail  82%  105% 
Accra  Rice  Retail  45%  3% 
Mali  Bamako  Millet  Wholesale  52%  75% 
Bamako  Rice  Wholesale  71%  46% 
Kayes  Millet  Wholesale  36%  52% 
Kayes  Rice  Wholesale  61%  40% 
Dakar  Millet  Retail  41%  59% 
Dakar  Rice  Retail  132%  87% 
Dakar  Sorghum  Retail  29%  42% 
Diourbel  Rice  Retail  85%  56% 
Fatick  Rice  Retail  87%  57% 
Kaolack  Rice  Retail  72%  47% 
Kolda  Rice  Retail  57%  37% 
Louga  Rice  Retail  56%  37% 
Matam  Millet  Retail  45%  65% 
Matam  Rice  Retail  58%  38% 
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Table 3. Continued 




converted to US$ 
Increase in domestic price 
as a pct of the increase in 
world price 
  Matam  Sorghum  Retail  32%  46% 
Saint Louis  Millet  Retail  41%  59% 
Saint Louis  Rice  Retail  31%  20% 
Saint Louis  Sorghun  Retail  41%  59% 
Tambacounda  Rice  Retail  54%  35% 
54  Thies  Rice  Retail  83%  54% 
Zquinchor  Rice  Retail  67%  44% 
Average        45%  42% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on price data from FAO (2009b and 2009c). 
Note: For millet, beans, cassava, and plantains, the last column compares the domestic price increase to the average increase in 
the world price of maize, rice, and wheat over the same time period. 
The trends in staple food prices over 2007–2008 are summarized in Table 4 and Table 5. 
According to Table 4, the average price increase across the 83 markets examined was 63 percent, which is 
71 percent of the price increase of the corresponding commodities in world markets. As discussed above, 
Malawi and Ethiopia experienced the sharpest increases in staple foodcrop prices over the reference 
period. In both cases, the average price increase was more than 100 percent, and in both cases the rise in 
domestic prices surpassed that in world prices for corresponding commodities. The countries with the 
lowest average price increase were South Africa (25 percent), Cameroon (32 percent), and Ghana (39 
percent).  
Table 4. Summary of food price increases by country 






Increase in domestic 
price as a pct of the 
increase in world price 
Cameroon  18  32%  32% 
Ethiopia  6  119%  174% 
Ghana  3  32%  39% 
Kenya  10  57%  69% 
Malawi  9  127%  158% 
Mali  4  55%  53% 
Mozambique  4  69%  78% 
Rwanda  3  54%  54% 
Senegal  17  60%  50% 
South Africa  3  16%  25% 
Tanzania  3  75%  78% 
Zambia  3  52%  73% 
Average or total  83  63%  71% 
Source: Author’s calculation based on price data from FAO (2009b and 2009c) 
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It is interesting to note that the food price increases appear to be greater in landlocked countries 
than in coastal countries. All the landlocked countries except Rwanda and Mali experienced staple food 
price increases greater than the average (71 percent), while all coastal countries except Mozambique had 
food price increases below this average. Landlocked countries face higher transportation costs from the 
ports, so imported foodcrops will have higher prices in landlocked countries, and food prices may 
fluctuate more widely because of the larger gap between export parity and import parity prices. But an 
increase in the world price should have the same absolute effect on the price of an imported food staple in 
both types of countries, and the percentage increase could well be smaller in the landlocked country 
because of the higher initial price.  
Of course, the spike in world food prices was accompanied by a similar increase in oil and other 
fuel costs. Thus, one possible explanation is that landlocked countries face both higher cost, insurance, 
and freight (CIF) prices of imported food and higher costs of overland transport. Grain export bans 
imposed by several African countries would also exacerbate the price spike in landlocked countries. 
Table 5 summarizes the same price data by commodity. Based on our sample of 83 markets in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and our reference period (June 2007 to June 2008), the largest increases in domestic 
food prices occurred in maize (87 percent), wheat (65 percent), and rice (62 percent). The smallest 
increases occurred in plantains (9 percent), cassava (12 percent), and beans (41 percent). This is not 
surprising, given that rice and wheat (and maize to a lesser degree) are the most tradable of the staple food 
commodities. In contrast, plantains, cassava, and beans are generally not traded internationally, though 
there is some cross-border trade among African countries. Thus, it is likely that the impact of the global 
food crisis influenced African countries directly through the price of imported wheat, rice, and (in some 
countries) maize. This would motivate consumers to shift away from these crops to nontradable food 
staples, thus indirectly pushing up the price of these substitutes. Because the nontradable staples are 
imperfect substitutes for the internationally traded staples, the price increase of the former was less than 
that of the latter. 
Table 5. Summary of food price increases by commodity 





Increase in domestic price as 
a pct of the increase in 
world price 
Beans  9  41%  45% 
Cassava  5  12%  13% 
Maize  26  87%  112% 
Millet  5  43%  62% 
Plantains  2  9%  9% 
Rice  24  62%  41% 
Sorghum  4  56%  81% 
Wheat  7  65%  111% 
Average  83  63%  71% 
Source: Author’s calculation based on price data from FAO (2009b and 2009c) 
These results should be interpreted with some caution, however. We have only a few price series 
available for some countries (such as three each for Ghana, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and 
Zambia) and for some commodities (for example, less than five each for plantains and sorghum).  
A bigger issue with this type of analysis is that we have compared domestic and international 
food price trends for one, rather exceptional, 12-month period. It is possible that the high domestic food 
prices were the result of poor weather and below-average harvests in a number of key countries. 
Alternatively, it is possible that world prices are transmitted when they change dramatically but not under 
more normal conditions that prevail in the long term. For this reason, we complement the descriptive 17 
analysis of price trends with an econometric analysis of the long-term relationship between domestic 
prices of staple foodcrops and the world price of the corresponding commodity.  
4.2. Econometric Analysis of Price Transmission  
This section describes the econometric analysis of the relationship between international and domestic 
prices using monthly data on 62 staple food prices in nine Sub-Saharan African countries over 5 to 10 
years. For each domestic price, we estimate a vector error correction model (VECM) that combines a food 
price from Sub-Saharan Africa (converted to U.S. dollars) and the international price of the same 
commodity.  
Before presenting the econometric results, however, it is useful to examine the descriptive 
statistics of the domestic and international price data being analyzed. As shown in Table 6 and Table 7, 
staple grain prices in Sub-Saharan Africa are almost universally higher than the world prices of the same 
commodities, in some cases significantly higher. For example, the average world price of rice was $210 
per ton, but the average price of rice in Ghana varied from $334 to $734, depending on the location. 
Similarly, the average world price of maize was $121 per ton, but the average maize price in different 
markets in Mozambique ranged from $177 to $285 per ton. Finally, the average world price of wheat was 
$167 per ton, but the Ethiopian wheat price averaged $261 per ton. The only exceptions were the price of 
maize in Kampala (Uganda), which averaged 24 percent below the world price, and the price of maize in 
Songea (Tanzania), which was approximately equal to the average world price. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the domestic price data  
Country  City  Commodity  N  Mean  Min  Max  Std. Dev. 
Ethiopia  Addis Ababa  Maize  180  170  55  609  87 
Addis Ababa  Sorghum  177  299  126  943  168 
Addis Ababa  Wheat  180  261  121  771  99 
Ghana  Accra  Imported rice  48  370  283  429  32 
Kumasi  Imported rice  48  372  285  456  28 
Kumasi  Local rice  48  734  412  832  117 
Tamale  Local rice  45  334  243  650  82 
Tamale  Local rice  46  438  310  528  56 
Techiman  Local rice  48  341  224  491  76 
Techiman  Local rice  48  500  343  597  66 
Kenya  Mombasa  Maize  180  210  104  363  51 
Nairobi  Maize  180  220  64  434  64 
Malawi  Chitipa  Maize  171  145  55  466  68 
Karonga  Maize  171  158  49  445  75 
Lilongwe  Maize  171  156  42  515  77 
Lunzu  Maize  153  194  69  535  92 
Mitundu  Maize  153  148  42  517  80 
Mzuzu  Maize  153  169  56  423  65 
Nkhata Bay  Maize  171  188  57  649  88 
Rumphi  Maize  171  175  56  637  73 
Mozambique  Beira  Maize  69  201  98  494  93 
Chokwe  Maize  69  252  141  535  98 
Chokwe  Rice  69  414  241  783  96 
Gorongosa  Rice  69  177  84  619  111 18 
Table 6. Continued 
Country  City  Commodity  N  Mean  Min  Max  Std. Dev. 
Mozambique  Gorongosa  Rice  69  533  326  1176  195 
Maputo  Rice  69  285  183  529  87 
Maputo  Rice  69  472  250  814  144 
Nampula  Rice  69  212  109  454  90 
Nampula  Rice  69  502  274  1060  208 
Tete  Rice  69  201  102  621  112 
Tete  Rice  69  657  339  1157  195 
Durban  White maize  204  136  56  199  37 
Durban  Yellow maize  204  128  56  201  32 
Randfontein  White maize  228  158  73  279  41 
Randfontein  Yellow maize  228  152  72  298  42 
South Africa  Arusha  Maize  60  170  108  293  44 
  Arusha  Rice  60  513  271  897  106 
  Arusha  White maize  60  182  104  547  81 
  Dar es Salam  White maize  60  171  114  271  44 
Tanzania  Dar es Salam  White maize  60  512  295  746  102 
Dar es Salam  Sorghum  60  264  147  657  91 
Dar es Salam  Sorghum  60  180  99  503  75 
Mbeya  Sorghum  60  135  79  282  44 
Mtwara  Sorghum  60  183  75  381  65 
Mtwara  Sorghum  60  519  340  750  97 
Mtwara  Sorghum  60  258  174  383  50 
Singida  Sorghum  60  170  92  302  51 
Singida  Sorghum  60  488  269  785  106 
Singida  Sorghum  60  174  103  286  50 
Songea  Sorghum  60  121  69  308  45 
Songea  Sorghum  60  416  172  621  84 
Kampala  Maize  93  92  32  229  39 
Mbale  Maize  69  130  51  199  38 
Chipata  Maize  68  207  119  376  67 
Choma  Maize  68  173  99  334  62 
Uganda  Kabwe Urban  Maize  68  194  97  458  73 
Kasama  Maize  68  192  97  380  73 
Zambia  Kitwe  Maize  68  211  114  424  76 
Lusaka  Maize  68  225  122  376  61 
Mansa  Maize  68  205  91  408  85 
Mongu  Maize  68  216  102  420  63 
Solwezi  Maize  68  199  70  401  83 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on price data from the Famine Early Warning Network (FEWS-NET) project, the Regional 
Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (RATIN, and national statistics offices.  19 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of international price data 
Commodity   Location  N  Mean  Min  Max  Std. Dev. 
Rice  Thailand   228  210  122  772  88 
Maize  US Gulf  179  121  75  294  39 
Wheat  US Gulf  228  167  105  482  61 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on price data from FAO 2009b 
Note: Rice price refers to Thai Super A1 broken white rice, FOB Bangkok. Maize price refers to U.S. No 2 yellow maize, FOB 
Gulf of Mexico. Wheat price refers to U.S. No 2 hard red winter wheat, FOB Gulf of Mexico. 
There are four likely reasons for the higher prices in Africa:  
•  First, the African prices are generally wholesale and retail prices, so they refer to purchases in 
smaller volumes and include local marketing margins.   
•  Second, for some crops, particularly rice and wheat, the cost of production and marketing is 
generally higher in Africa, as a result of lower yields, higher rates of spoilage, and higher 
costs of transportation. 
•  Third, the cost of sea-freight and overland transportation means that the full cost of delivering 
imported grain to African markets (the import parity price) is higher than the world price.   
•  Fourth, in many cases import tariffs, import restrictions, or administrative procedures raise 
the cost of importing grain or prevent grain imports, raising the domestic price above the 
import parity price.  
In addition to the differences between domestic and world prices, there are significant disparities 
between prices in different countries. For example, the price of white maize in Durban is $136 per ton, 
but 470 kilometers up the coast in Maputo, the price of maize is $285 per ton. In addition, the price of 
local rice in Tamale (northern Ghana) is $438, compared to $734 in Kumasi (central Ghana). In both case, 
it is difficult to imagine that the cost of transportation could explain such large differences. 
Finally, Table 8 compares the coefficient of variation (CV), a common measure of volatility, in 
grain prices in Sub-Saharan Africa and world markets. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the mean of the world price. The coefficient of variation of the import parity price is 
estimated assuming that the import parity price is $100 per ton greater than the world price. In the case of 
maize, African prices are substantially more volatile than the estimated import parity price of maize. 
Although not shown here, the volatility of maize prices in South Africa, a source of imported maize for 
many African countries, is also significantly lower than maize prices in Sub-Saharan Africa in general. In 
the case of rice, the estimated volatility of the import parity price is slightly higher than that of domestic 
African prices. In the case of wheat, we have only one wheat price, that of Addis Ababa. This Addis 
Ababa wheat price is more volatile than the estimated import parity price of wheat.  
Table 8. Comparison of price volatility 






Coefficient of variation of 
import parity 
World prices 
Maize  121  39  33%  18% 
Rice  210  88  42%  28% 
Wheat  167  61  36%  23% 
Domestic prices in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Maize  180  68  38%   
Rice  477  105  22%   
Wheat  261  99  38%   
Source: Authors’ calculations based on price data from FEWS-NET, RATIN, national statistics offices, and FAO 2009b. 20 
Turning to the econometric analysis, Table 9 provides a summary of the results for seven prices 
from three eastern African countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
indicates that five of the seven African prices have unit roots, while the Phillips-Perron test suggests that 
six of the seven have unit roots. As described in section 2.2, a price with a unit root is one that follows a 
“random walk” without any tendency to return to a long-run average. It also implies that the econometric 
analysis needs to be carried out with an error correction model using the change in prices (pt - pt-1) rather 
than an autoregressive model using the level of prices (pt).  
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Ethiopia  Addis Ababa  Maize  Yes  Yes  No   
Ethiopia  Addis Ababa  Sorghum  No  Yes  No   
Ethiopia  Addis Ababa  Wheat  No  No  Stationary   
Kenya  Mombasa  Maize  Yes  Yes  Stationary   
Kenya  Nairobi  Maize  Yes  Yes  Stationary   
Uganda  Kampala  Maize  Yes  Yes  No   
Uganda  Mbale  Maize  Yes  Yes  Stationary   
Source: Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 
Next, we use the Johansen cointegration test to see if there is a long-run relationship between 
each domestic price and the corresponding international price. In three of the seven, the Johansen test 
indicates that there is no statistically significant long-run relationship. In the other four, the Johansen test 
suggests that the variables are stationary, that is, they are integrated: I(0). This suggests the need for a 
vector autoregression (VAR) model estimating the domestic price as a function of lagged domestic prices 
and international prices, with all variables expressed in logarithms. Using just one month of lagged terms, 
the international price has a statistically significant effect on the domestic price the next month in three of 
the four cases (Nairobi maize, Mombasa maize, and Addis Ababa wheat). However, the coefficients 
suggest that the relationship is fairly weak, with a short-term transmission of just eight to nine percent of 
the change in international prices. Statistical tests
9
As shown in Table 10, of the eight maize markets in Tanzania, only in Arusha was there a 
significant long-run relationship with the world price of maize. In this case, about 54 percent of the 
variation in world prices is eventually transmitted to the maize price in Arusha. This may be the result of 
the location of Arusha, near the Kenyan border. Although Tanzania is only an occasional and marginal 
importer of maize, Kenya imports maize on a regular basis. In addition, there is cross-border trade in 
maize from Tanzania to Kenya, which may indirectly link Arusha prices to the world market.  
 indicate the need to include two months of lagged 
terms, and in this version of the VAR, the coefficients on the world price are both small and statistically 
insignificant. 
Four of the eight rice markets in Tanzania appeared to be linked to world rice markets. The 
elasticity of price transmission ranges from 0.24 to 0.54, suggesting that 24 to 54 percent of the changes 
in world rice prices are transmitted to Tanzanian markets.  
                                                       
9 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to select the lag length, but this test generally agreed with other tests 
such as Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion.  21 
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Tanzania  Arusha  Maize  No  No  Yes  0.54 *  -0.23  0.54 
Tanzania  Dar es Salam  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Tanzania  Mbeya  Maize  No  No  No       
Tanzania  Arusha  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Tanzania  Dar es Salam  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Tanzania  Mtwara  Maize  No  No  No       
Tanzania  Singida  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Tanzania  Songea  Maize  No   Yes  No       
Tanzania  Arusha  Rice  No  No  No       
Tanzania  Dar es Salam  Rice  No  No  Yes  0.58 *  1.12 *  0.54 * 
Tanzania  Mtwara  Rice  No  No  Yes  0.50 *  0.77  0.28 
Tanzania  Singida  Rice  No  No  No       
Tanzania  Songea  Rice  No  No  Yes  0.65 *  0.86  0.24 
Tanzania  Dar es Salam  Sorghum  No  No  No       
Tanzania  Mtwara  Sorghum  Yes  Yes  Yes  0.30 *  0.84  0.54 * 
Tanzania  Singida  Sorghum  Yes  Yes  No       
Source: Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 
Note: * statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The results for Malawi are shown in Table 11. Only three of the eight maize markets in Malawi 
showed a significant long-run relationship with the world maize price: Chitipa, Lilongwe, and Nkhata 
Bay. Chitipa is located in the northern tip of Malawi and adjacent to the main maize surplus zone of 
Tanzania. The elasticity of transmission is large (0.70) but not statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level (it is, however, significant at the 10 percent level). Lilongwe is the capital city and headquarters of 
the state-owned Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation ADMARC, which generally 
manages international trade in maize. The long-run elasticity of price transmission is not statistically 
significant. Nkhata Bay is an important port on Lake Malawi, located in the north center of the country. 
Again, the long-run elasticity of price transmission is not significant. 
   22 
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Malawi  Chitipa  Maize  Yes  No  Yes  0.14 *  0.09  0.70 
Malawi  Karonga  Maize  No  No  No       
Malawi  Lilongwe  Maize  No  No  Yes  0.20 *  0.44  -0.07 
Malawi  Lunzu  Maize  No  No  No       
Malawi  Mitundu  Maize  No  No  No       
Malawi  Mzuzu  Maize  No  No  No       
Malawi  Nkhata Bay  Maize  No  No  Yes  0.20 *  0.44  0.07 
Malawi  Rumphi  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Source: Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 
Note: * statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Table 12 provides the results for nine maize markets in Zambia. The Johansen test indicates that 
none of the local prices had a long-run relationship with international maize prices.  
The results for Mozambique are presented in Table 13, including tests for six maize markets and 
five rice markets. None of the six maize markets showed evidence of a long-run relationship between 
local and international maize prices. On the other hand, four of the five rice markets in the country did 
show a long-run relationship with world rice prices. The long-run elasticity of price transmission is 
statistically significant in these four rice markets. The elasticity is relatively high for Nampula, an inland 
city in the north, and Tete, located in the remote western part of Mozambique, between Zimbabwe and 
Malawi. The long-run elasticity of price transmission is smaller in Chokwe and Gorongosa. The only rice 
market whose price is not cointegrated with the world price is Maputo, the capital city, located at the 
southern tip of the country.  
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Zambia  Chipata  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Zambia  Choma  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Zambia  Kabwe urban  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Zambia  Kasama  Maize  Yes  No  No       
Zambia  Kitwe  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Zambia  Lusaka  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Zambia  Mansa  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Zambia  Mongu  Maize  Yes  No  No       
Zambia  Solwezi  Maize  No  No  No       
Source: Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 23 























Error correction model 


















Mozambique  Beira  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Mozambique  Chokwe  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Mozambique  Gorongos
 
Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Mozambique  Maputo  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Mozambique  Nampula  Maize  Yes  Yes  No       
Mozambique  Tete  Maize  Yes   Yes  No       
Mozambique  Chokwe  Rice  No  No  No  0.37 *  -0.24  0.39 * 
Mozambique  Gorongos
 
Rice  Yes  Yes  No  0.31 *  -0.23  0.16 * 
Mozambique  Maputo  Rice  Yes  Yes  No       
Mozambique  Nampula  Rice  Yes  Yes  No  0.30 *  -0.24  0.97 * 
Mozambique  Tete  Rice  Yes  Yes  No  0.30 *  -0.40 *  0.70 * 
Source: Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 
Note: * statistically significant at the 5% level. 
As shown in Table 14, we analyzed the relationship between four maize prices in South Africa 
and world maize prices. The unit root tests confirm that all four prices are nonstationary in levels but 
stationary in differences. However, the Johansen test indicates that the domestic and international prices 
are stationary in levels. This suggests the need to adopt a vector autoregression (VAR) model of the level 
of the domestic price, as discussed above in the case of the eastern African prices. In both one- and two-
month lag versions of the VAR, world maize prices had no significant effect on South African maize 
prices.  
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South Africa  Durban  White maize  Yes  Yes  Stationary       
South Africa  Randfontein  White maize  Yes  Yes  Stationary       
South Africa  Durban  Yellow maize  Yes  Yes  Stationary       
South Africa  Randfontein  Yellow maize  Yes  Yes  Stationary       
Source: Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 
Table 15 shows the results of testing the cointegration of Ghanaian rice prices with world rice 
prices. Of the seven rice markets in the country, only one shows a significant relationship with the world 
rice price: Kumasi, a major city in the south-central region of the country. The long-run elasticity of price 
transmission is 0.47, but it is not statistically significant.  24 
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Ghana  Accra  Imported rice  No   No  No       
Ghana  Kumasi  Imported rice  Yes  Yes  No       
Ghana  Tamale  Imported rice  No  No  No       
Ghana  Techiman  Imported rice  Yes  Yes  No       
Ghana  Kumasi  Local rice  No  No  Yes  0.20 *  -0.13  0.47 
Ghana  Tamale  Local rice  No  No  No       
Ghana  Techiman  Local rice  Yes  Yes  No       
Source:  Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 
Note: * statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The maize results presented above are based on testing the long-run relationship between 
domestic maize prices in Sub-Saharan Africa and the world maize price in the form of the U.S. No 2 
yellow maize price in the Gulf of Mexico. There are two reasons to think that domestic African prices 
may be more closely related to South African maize prices than to world prices. First, a number of 
southern and eastern African countries import maize from South Africa rather than from markets outside 
Africa. Second, yellow maize dominates world markets for maize, but white maize is strongly preferred 
among African consumers. South Africa is one of the few countries that exports white maize in 
significant volumes. For this reason, we carried out the error correction model comparing domestic maize 
prices with the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) white maize price. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
results were the qualitatively the same: Very few of the domestic maize prices showed a long-run 
relationship with the South African maize prices.  
The results of the econometric analysis of the link between world and African domestic prices are 
summarized by country in Table 16. Overall, 13 of the 62 staple food prices tested showed a statistically 
significant long-run relationship with world prices according to the Johansen cointegration test. Malawi, 
Mozambique, and Ethiopia have the highest proportion of prices that are linked to world markets, though 
the percentage is less than 40 percent even in these countries. Zambia, Uganda, South Africa, and Kenya 
have no prices that show a long-run relationship with world markets.  
Table 16. Summary of price transmission by country 
  Prices with relationship  Total nbr. of prices  Percentage 
Ethiopia  1  3  33% 
Ghana  1  7  14% 
Kenya  0  2  0% 
Malawi  3  8  38% 
Mozambique  4  11  36% 
South Africa  0  4  0% 
Tanzania  4  16  25% 
Uganda  0  2  0% 
Zambia  0  9  0% 
Total  13  62  21% 
Source: Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 25 
Table 17 summarizes the results by commodity. It reveals that almost half of the rice prices have 
a statistically significant long-run relationship with world rice prices. In contrast, the proportion is just 10 
percent for maize. Thus, according to the econometric analysis of prices, rice markets in Africa are 
generally better connected to world markets than are maize markets.  
Table 17. Summary of price transmission by commodity 
  Prices with relationship  Total nbr. of prices  Percentage 
Maize  4  40  10% 
 
Rice  8  17  47% 
Sorghum  1  4  25% 
Wheat  0  1  0% 
Total  13  62  21% 
Source: Authors’ analysis using price data from various sources. 
These results are understandable in light of the relative importance of trade in maize and rice. As 
shown in Figure 2, maize trade represents no more than 5 percent of domestic apparent consumption in all 
but one country (Mozambique is the exception). In contrast, most of the countries under consideration are 
highly reliant on rice imports. Imports account for more than half of apparent domestic consumption of 
rice in six of the nine countries.  
Figure 2. Net imports of maize and rice as a percentage of apparent consumption for selected 
African countries 
 
Source: FAO 2009a. 
Note: Apparent consumption is defined as production plus net imports. 
   26 
5.  SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
This section reviews the results of the study and discusses some implications. Section 5.1 summarizes the 
trends in staple food prices in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 2007–2008. Section 5.2 describes the 
econometric analysis of price transmission from international markets to domestic markets in Africa. The 
implications of the results of the study for policy are discussed in Section 5.3, and the implications for 
future research are described in Section 5.4.  
5.1. Staple Food Price Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Staple food prices in Sub-Saharan Africa have risen rapidly since 2006, even in U.S. dollar terms. Across 
83 food prices in 12 countries examined, the average increase between June 2007 and June 2008 was 63 
percent in U.S. dollar terms. This represents an average of 71 percent of the increase in the price on 
international markets for the corresponding commodities. There is, however, considerable variation across 
countries and commodities. For example, food price increases were relatively small (25–39 percent) in 
South Africa, Ghana, and Cameroon. On the other hand, food price increases were quite large (over 150 
percent) in Ethiopia and Malawi. Since the price increases in these latter two countries actually exceeded 
the price increase in the world markets for the same commodities, this suggests that the world price was 
not the only factor contributing to the price increases: domestic factors (such as supply shortages or policy 
failures) must have also played a role. The price increases in domestic African markets also varied by 
commodity. The price increases in African markets were highest for maize (87 percent), followed by 
wheat (65 percent) and rice (62 percent). Other commodities experienced smaller increases, particularly 
plantains (9 percent) and cassava (12 percent). The degree of price increase appears to be related to the 
degree of tradability: As described in section 2.2, highly tradable commodities are more closely linked to 
international markets, so domestic prices of these commodities tracked the spike in world prices. 
Commodities that are less widely traded in international markets saw smaller price increases in African 
markets.  
5.2. Econometric Analysis of Food Price Transmission from International to African 
Markets 
The above analysis is based on the simple ratio of local to international price increases over June 2007 to 
June 2008. We also carried out an econometric analysis of the degree to which local prices track world 
prices using a vector error correction model. The data consisted of 62 domestic price series for maize, 
rice, and wheat in nine Sub-Saharan African countries. Each domestic price series was tested against the 
world price of the same commodity.  
Based on the Johansen test, only 13 of the 62 price series showed a long-run relationship in which 
the domestic price was influenced by the international price of the same commodity. Of the 13 domestic 
prices that showed a long-run relationship with international prices, only 6 had a long-term elasticity of 
transmission that was statistically significant. These 6 elasticities ranged from 0.16 to 0.97, with a median 
value of 0.54. The median value implies that 54 percent of a percentage change in international prices 
would be transmitted to the domestic price of the same commodity.  
Although barely one-fifth of the 62 African prices tested showed a statistically significant link to 
international prices, there was some variation in the proportion across countries and commodities. 
Malawi, Mozambique, and Ethiopia had the highest proportion of prices that were linked to world 
markets, though the share was less than 40 percent in all three cases. Zambia, Uganda, and Kenya had no 
prices that showed a long-run relationship with world markets.  
The differences across commodities were somewhat clearer. Just 10 percent of the domestic 
maize prices tested was significantly related to world maize prices, but almost half of the domestic rice 
prices were related to world rice prices. This implies that rice markets in Africa were generally better 
connected to world markets than were maize markets. This result is not surprising in light of the fact that 27 
most Sub-Saharan African countries are close to self-sufficient in maize but rely heavily on imported rice 
to meet local demand. More specifically, the traded volume of maize is equivalent to less than 5 percent 
of the domestic consumption in eight of the nine countries under consideration; the exception is 
Mozambique, where maize imports are equivalent to 14 percent of domestic production. Among the three 
countries whose rice prices were tested, rice imports represent more than 50 percent of domestic 
consumption in Ghana and Mozambique and 11 percent in Tanzania. 
A key question is how to reconcile the trend analysis, which shows almost all domestic African 
prices rising, apparently in response to the global food crisis of 2007–2008, and the econometric analysis, 
which suggests that often there was no relationship between world prices and domestic African prices for 
the same commodities. There are several possible explanations for this. 
First, the two analyses cover different time periods: The trend analysis describes price increases 
over June 2007 to June 2008, while the econometric analysis covers the last four to eight years. It is 
possible that policy reforms in recent years have made African markets more responsive to conditions of 
world markets. This hypothesis seems unlikely, however. Although African economies are more open 
than they were in the early 1990s, there has been no dramatic movement toward liberalized trade that 
would make transmission higher in 2007–2008 than in 2003–2007.  
Second, unlike normal fluctuation in world food prices, the food crisis coincided with a sharp 
increase in oil prices, from $71 per barrel in June 2007 to $133 per barrel a year later (see Figure 1). This 
led to much higher costs for fertilizer, sea freight, and overland transportation, which raised the cost of 
both domestically, produced and imported food. Since fuel costs represent less than half of transportation 
costs, and transportation costs generally account for up to half of imported food costs, an 87 percent 
increase in fuel prices could account for a 20 to 25 percent increase in imported grain costs. Thus, higher 
fuel costs may be an important contributing factor, but they are not enough to explain the full increase in 
African staple food prices. 
Third, the food crisis provoked a wave of grain export restrictions in Sub-Saharan Africa as well 
as elsewhere. As mentioned above, during the food crisis, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania all banned the 
export of maize, while several western African countries attempted to ban grain exports with varying 
degrees of success (see Staatz et al. 2008). Although the effect is difficult to quantify, these restrictions 
probably raised grain prices in landlocked countries.  
Fourth, in some cases, policy responses and local factors exacerbated the effect of the global food 
crisis. In Ethiopia, local grain prices rose above import parity price because fuel subsidies and restrictions 
on the foreign exchange market created a shortage of foreign currency, preventing private traders from 
importing grain. In Kenya, post-election disturbances and poor rains contributed to a smaller-than-average 
harvest, and maize imports were impeded by a high tariff and delays in government importation. In 
Malawi, a government procurement program for export (possibly based on overestimates of the harvest) 
and tight restrictions on private trade contributed to a spike in domestic maize prices, which exceeded the 
import parity price. 
Fifth, there are likely to be threshold effects such that small changes in world food prices are not 
transmitted to African markets or their effects on African markets are not measurable given the price 
fluctuations due to variation in domestic supply. Most African grain prices exhibit large spikes that are 
unrelated to world prices and are presumably driven by poor harvests. However, when the shock from 
international markets is large, as it was in 2007–2008, the price changes are transmitted to local markets 
or at least the transmission to local markets becomes measurable.  
In summary, we conclude that international prices of food grains do have some effect on African 
markets for rice and (to a lesser degree) maize, but the effect is usually swamped by the dominant effect 
of weather-related domestic supply shocks. The spike in world prices in 2007–2008 was more clearly 
transmitted because (1) it was a large shock, (2) it was accompanied by sharply higher transportation 
costs, (3) attempts by African countries to ban grain exports contributed to food price increases in 
neighboring countries, and (4) local factors and restrictions on private trade exacerbated the price 
increases in some countries.  28 
5.3. Policy Implications of the Findings 
The global food crisis of 2007–2008 has understandably shaken confidence in the stability and reliability 
of world food markets. In many countries, it has sparked renewed interest in food self-sufficiency, trade 
barriers, and strategic grain reserves.  
In light of these findings, an obvious question is this: How can African countries reduce 
vulnerability to fluctuations in world food prices? The simplest answer is staple food self-sufficiency, but 
how is this to be achieved? One approach would be to invest in agricultural research, extension, disease 
control, and methods for reducing post-harvest losses. Based on numerous studies of the returns to 
agricultural research, this would probably be a good investment regardless of the net trade position of the 
country in staple foods and regardless of whether it succeeded in achieving self-sufficiency (see Alston et 
al. 2000 for a review of studies of the returns to agricultural research). But it would be a long-term 
strategy, which limits its appeal in the political arena. The likelihood of success varies by crop: For maize, 
it would be feasible given that most African countries are 90 to 95 percent self-sufficient in maize 
already. For rice and wheat, the rate of self-sufficiency could be increased, but for most eastern and 
southern African countries, yield improvements alone are not likely to be enough to reach self-
sufficiency.
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Another approach, probably more appealing in the short term, is to restrict imports through 
tariffs, quotas, or an import ban. If enforceable, these policies would increase the rate of self-sufficiency 
quickly at no cost to the government, but they would raise the price of staple foods significantly, probably 
above the levels experienced during the global food crisis. Since rice and wheat imports continued during 
this period, the “self-sufficiency” price for these commodities must be still higher. This means that 
avoiding vulnerability to a spike in world grain prices like the one in 2007–2008 would require keeping 
grain prices permanently at or above the levels experienced during the height of the global food crisis. 
Clearly, this would have serious adverse effects on the food security of many households, particularly the 
urban poor. 
  
In addition, staple food self-sufficiency would not eliminate food price volatility; rather, it would 
decrease volatility due to international markets but increase volatility due to domestic supply shocks. The 
key question is whether price volatility due to domestic supply shocks would be greater or less than 
volatility due to international grain markets. Although more in-depth analysis would require trade 
modeling beyond the scope of this study, several pieces of evidence suggest that price volatility due to 
domestic supply shocks is as large as or larger than volatility due to international markets: 
•  The price of maize in South Africa (a source of imported maize for its neighbors) is more 
stable than the price of maize in most other Sub-Saharan African countries. The coefficient of 
variation (CV) of maize prices on the South African commodity exchange is about 0.26, 
compared to an average of 0.38 in Sub-Saharan Africa in general.  
•  The estimated import parity price of U.S. maize in Sub-Saharan Africa is more stable than the 
domestic price of maize in most Sub-Saharan African countries. The estimated CV of the 
import parity price of U.S. maize is just 0.18. This is based on a conservative (low) 
assumption of $100 per ton cost of delivery. If the delivery cost is higher, the CV of the 
import parity price would be even lower.  
•  In markets of Sub-Saharan Africa, the price of rice (a largely tradable grain) is more stable 
than the price of maize (a largely nontradable grain). The average CV of rice prices in 13 
African markets is 0.22, compared to the average CV of maize prices in 40 African markets 
of 0.38.  
As discussed above, the global food crisis was exacerbated when several major exporters 
(including Argentina, Russia, India, and Vietnam) restricted grain exports in response to the rising prices. 
                                                       
10 Madagascar and Tanzania import less than 10 percent of their rice requirements, so rice self-sufficiency is a feasible target 
there.  29 
As food importers, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have a strong interest in limiting this kind of 
behavior. One way to do this would be to lobby the World Trade Organization and other international 
bodies to establish rules limiting the use of food export restrictions as part of multilateral trade 
agreements.  
Similarly, the effects of another spike in world food prices could be ameliorated if African 
countries themselves refrained from banning grain exports. Although these bans are understandable from 
the perspective of an individual country, the combined effect of many countries doing this is to exacerbate 
the price spike, particularly for landlocked and food-importing countries. Given this situation, any effort 
to prevent food export bans would have to be carried out at the regional level rather than at the national 
level. In addition, an effort by African countries to discipline food export restrictions at the global level 
would be more persuasive if these countries were undertaking similar measures at the regional level.  
The experience of Ethiopia, Malawi, and other countries indicates that grain prices occasionally 
exceed the import parity price because of (1) the rationing of foreign exchange to prevent depreciation of 
the currency, (2) the inability of traders to obtain food import permits, and (3) uncertainty regarding the 
government’s intentions regarding food imports. The policy implications are as follows: 
•  Either allows the currency to depreciate in order to avoid foreign exchange shortages that 
constrain food importers or (as a second-best solution) give priority to food imports in 
rationing foreign currency.  
•  Remove the requirement that importers obtain permits to import food grains, although they 
should be required to register the import orders for data collection and transparency purposes.  
•  Governments need to provide a clear and predictable environment for traders to make 
decisions. One approach would be for the government to withdraw from the business of 
trading in food grains. If this is not politically feasible, the government needs to be as 
transparent as possible in its trading decisions. Subsidized sales of grain by the government 
should be targeted to poor and vulnerable groups rather than made available to, for example, 
all urban consumers.  
In the longer term, African governments can promote resilience to volatility in international grain 
prices by diversifying the staple foods diet of consumers. During the global food crisis, the domestic 
prices of cassava, sweet potatoes, and other nontradable staple foods rose much less than the prices of 
rice, wheat, and maize. Having a diversified diet allows households to substitute toward less expensive 
staples when the price of one of them rises. Staple crop diversification can be promoted on the production 
side by investing in cassava and other root crops, particularly in the areas of developing disease-resistant 
varieties and distributing improved planting materials. On the consumption side, efforts can be made to 
develop and disseminate methods for processing root crops and nontradable grains to increase shelf life 
and make food preparation easier. 
5.4. Implications for Research 
The results presented in this study raise a number of questions and issues for future research on price 
transmission and the welfare impact of food price increases.  
First, the error correction model measures the degree of co-movement in prices regardless of 
whether the price difference justifies trade between the two locations. A low degree of price transmission 
may be due to inefficient markets, justifiably high costs of moving commodities between distant 
locations, or both. A threshold autoregressive model distinguishes between situations when the price 
difference is large, justifying trade between the markets and co-movement of prices, and when the price 
difference is small, during which no co-movement is expected (see Van Campenhout 2007 and Myers 
2008). Such a model would provide additional information on the “threshold” price difference, below 
which co-movement ceases. The threshold can be considered a measure of the actual marketing cost 
between the two markets, including normal profit and risk premiums. 
Second, more research is needed to explain the paradox that (1) long-term econometric analysis 30 
reveals that few African prices are linked to world commodity markets, yet (2) domestic prices in African 
markets rose sharply during the world food crisis of 2007–2008. Several hypotheses to explain this were 
proposed in section 5.2. Further research would help to narrow the list of possible explanations. 
Third, the research could be extended to a larger set of African countries, a larger set of grain 
prices within each country, a longer series of price data, or a combination of these. In particular, not all 
the price series included the period of the global food crisis, so it would be useful to update the analysis 
by including more recent price data. 
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Characteristics of Price Data Used in Econometric Analysis 
Table A.1. Characteristics of international price data 
Commodity  Details  Time period  Source 
Maize   U.S. No 2 yellow maize, FOB Gulf of 
Mexico  Jan 90–Dec 08  FAO 2009b 
Maize SAFEX  South African white maize, FOB 
Johannesburg  Jan 90–Dec 08  SAFEX 2009 
Wheat  U.S. No 2 hard red winter wheat, 
FOB Gulf of Mexico  Jan 90–Dec 08  FAO 2009b 
Rice  Thai Super A1 broken rice, FOB 
Bangkok  Jan 90–Dec 08  FAO 2009b 
Sorghum  U.S. No 2 yellow sorghum, FOB Gulf 
of Mexico  Jan 90–Dec 08  FAO 2009b 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Table A.2. Characteristics of domestic price data from Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country  Commodity  Market  Time period 
Ethiopia  Addis Ababa  Maize  Mar 94–Dec 08 
Ethiopia  Addis Ababa  Sorghum  Mar 99–Nov 08 
Ethiopia  Addis Ababa  Wheat  Mar 94–Dec 08 
Ghana  Accra  Imported rice  Mar 04–Dec 07 
Ghana  Kumasi  Imported rice  Mar 04–Dec 07 
Ghana  Tamale  Imported rice  Apr 04–Oct 07 
Ghana  Techiman  Imported rice  Mar 04–Dec 07 
Ghana  Kumasi  Local rice  Mar 04–Dec 07 
Ghana  Tamale  Local rice  Mar 04–Oct 07 
Ghana  Techiman  Local rice  Mar 04–Dec 07 
Kenya  Mombasa  Maize  Mar 94–Nov 08 
Kenya  Nairobi  Maize  Mar 94–Nov 08 
Malawi  Chitipa  Maize  Mar 94–Mar 08 
Malawi  Karonga  Maize  Mar 94–Mar 08 
Malawi  Lilongwe  Maize  Mar 94–Mar 08 
Malawi  Lunzu  Maize  Mar 94–Sep 06 
Malawi  Mitundu  Maize  Mar 94–Sep 06 
Malawi  Mzuzu  Maize  Mar 94–Sep 06 
Malawi  Nkhata Bay  Maize  Mar 94–Mar 08 
Malawi  Rumphi  Maize  Mar 94–Mar 08 
Mozambique  Beira  Maize  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Chokwe  Maize  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Gorongosa  Maize  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Maputo  Maize  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Nampula  Maize  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Tete  Maize  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Chokwe  Rice  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Gorongosa  Rice  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Maputo  Rice  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Nampula  Rice  Jun 03–Dec 08 
Mozambique  Tete  Rice  Jun 03–Dec 08 
South Africa  Durban  White maize  Mar 94–Dec 06 
South Africa  Randfontein  White maize  Mar 94–Dec 08 32 
Table A.2. Continued 
Country  Commodity  Market  Time period 
South Africa  Durban  Yellow maize  Mar 94–Dec 06 
South Africa  Randfontein  Yellow maize  Mar 94–Dec 08 
Tanzania  Arusha  Maize  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam  Maize  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Mbeya  Maize  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Mtwara  Maize  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Singida  Maize  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Songea  Maize  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Arusha  Rice  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam  Rice  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Mtwara  Rice  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Singida  Rice  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Songea  Rice  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam  Sorghum  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Mtwara  Sorghum  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Tanzania  Singida  Sorghum  Mar 03–Dec 07 
Uganda  Kampala  Maize  Jun 01–Dec 08 
Uganda  Mbale  Maize  Mar 01–Sep 06 
Zambia  Chipata  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Zambia  Choma  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Zambia  Kabwe urban  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Zambia  Kasama  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Zambia  Kitwe  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Zambia  Lusaka  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Zambia  Mansa  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Zambia  Mongu  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Zambia  Solwezi  Maize  Jul 03–Dec 08 
Sources:  Ethiopia: Ethiopia Grain Trading Enterprise. Ghana:  West Africa Agritrade Network. Kenya: 
Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network. Malawi: FEWS-NET. 
Mozambique: FEWS-NET. South Africa: SAFEX. Tanzania: FEWS-NET. Uganda: Regional Agricultural 




Abdulai, A. 2000. Spatial price transmission and asymmetry in the Ghanaian maize market. Journal of Development 
Economics 63:327–349. 
Alston, J., C. Chan-Kang, M. Marra, P. Pardey, and T. J. Wyatt. 2000. A meta-analysis of rates of return to 
agricultural R&D: Ex pede Herculem? Research Report 113. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy 
Research Institute.  
Babcock, B. 2008. Statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs. 
Hearing on fuel subsidies and impact on food prices, May 7, Washington, D.C.  
Balke, N., and T. Fomby. 1997. Threshold cointegration. International Economic Review 38:627–645. 
Banda, S. 2008. Zambia too suspends maize exports. Africa News. May 8. 
<http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/18092>. Accessed June 15, 2008.  
Barrett, C., and J. R. Li. 2002. Distinguishing between equilibrium and integration in spatial price analysis. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84 (2): 292–307. 
Baulch, B. 1997. Testing for food market integration revisited. Journal of Development Studies 33:477–487. 
Benson, T., N. Minot, J. Pender, M. Robles, and J. von Braun. 2008. Global food crises: Monitoring and assessing 
impact to inform policy responses. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.  
BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). 2009.  Consumer Price Index – All Urban Consumers.  Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Labor.  < ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt> Accessed February 3, 2009.  
Conforti, P. 2004. Price transmission in selected agricultural markets. Commodity and Trade Policy Research 
Working Paper No 7. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation. 
Engle, R., and C. Granger. 1987. Co-integration and error-correction: Representation, estimation, and testing. 
Econometrica 55:251–76. 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 2009a. FAOStat database. Rome. <http://faostat.fao.org>. Accessed 
November 20, 2009. 
________. 2009b. FAO international commodity prices database. Rome. 
<http://www.fao.org/es/esc/prices/PricesServlet.jsp?lang=en>. Accessed April 11, 2010 
________. 2009c. FAO Global information and early warning system (GIEWS) price tool. Rome. 
<http://www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/>. Accessed July 20, 2009. 
________. 2009d. Global cereal supply and demand brief. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, no. 2. April. Rome. 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/ai481e/ai481e04.htm>. Accessed April 30, 2009. 
Granger, C., and P. Newbold. 1974. Spurious regression in econometrics. Journal of Econometrics 60:1045–1066.  
Hansen, B., and B. Seo. 2002. Testing for two-regime threshold cointegration in vector error-correction models. 
Journal of Econometrics 110:293–318. 
Harriss, B. 1979. There is method in my madness: Or it is vice-versa? Measuring agricultural market performance. 
Food Research Institute Studies 16:97–218. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2009. International Financial Statistics.  Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2010. IMF primary commodity prices. 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp>. Accessed April 4, 2010.  
Kuiper, W., C. Lutz, and A. van Tilburg. 2003. Vertical price leadership on local maize markets in Benin. Journal of 
Development Economics 71:417–433. 
Lazear, E. 2008. Response to the global food crisis. Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. May 
14. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/lazear20080514.html>. Accessed June 16, 2008. 34 
Loening, J., D. Durevall, and Y. Birru. 2008. Inflation dynamics and food prices in an agricultural economic: The 
case of Ethiopia. Policy Research Working Paper 4969. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.  
Lutz, C., W. E. Kuiper, and a. van Tilburg. 2006. Maize Market Liberalisation in Benin: A Case of Hysteresis. 
Journal of African Economies 16, no. 1: 102-133. Myers, R. 2008. Evaluating the efficiency of inter-
regional trade and storage in Malawi maize markets. Report for the World Bank. East Lansing, Mich., 
U.S.A.: Michigan State University. 
Moser, C., C. Barrett, and B. Minten. 2009. Spatial integration at multiple scales: Rice markets in Madagascar. 
Agricultural Economics 40:281–294. 
Mundlak, Y., and D. Larson. 1992. On the transmission of world agricultural prices. The World Bank Economic 
Review 6 (3): 399–422. 
Negassa, A., and R. Myers. 2007. Estimating policy effects on spatial market efficiency: An extension to the parity 
bounds model. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89:338–352. 
Phillips, P. C. B. 1987. Time series regression with a unit root. Econometrica 55:277–301. 
Quiroz, J., and R. Soto. 1995. International price signals in agricultural prices: Do governments care? Documento 
de investigacion 88. Santiago, Chile: ILADES Postgraduate Economics Program, Georgetown University.  
Ravallion, M. 1986. Testing marketing integration. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68 (2): 292–307.  
Rosegrant, M. 2008. Biofuels and grain prices: Impacts and policy responses. Testimony for the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. May 7, Washington, D.C. 
SAFEX (South African Futures Exchange). 2009. JSE SAFEX agricultural products. 
<http://www.safex.co.za/ap/market_price_history.asp>. Accessed May 7, 2009.  
Sanders, D., S. Irwin, and R. Merrin. 2008. The adequacy of speculation in agricultural futures markets: Too much 
of a good thing? Marketing and Outlook Research Report 2008-02. Urbana, Ill., U.S.A.: Department of 
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
<http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/marketing/morr/morr_archive.html>. Accessed July 10, 2008. 
Schnepf, R. 2008. High agricultural commodity prices: What are the issues? Report RL34474. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service. <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34474_20080529.pdf>. Accessed July 
10, 2008. 
Staatz, J., N. Dembélé, V. Kelly, and R. Adjao. 2008. Agricultural globalization in reverse: The impact of the food 
crisis in West Africa. Background paper for the Geneva Trade and Development Forum, September 17–20, 
2008, Crans-Montana, Switzerland. East Lansing, Mich., U.S.A.: Department of Agricultural, Food, and 
Resource Economics, Michigan State University. 
<http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/srai/Agricultural_Globalization_in_Reverse_MSU_Crans-
Montana_paper_final.pdf>. Accessed May 13, 2008. 
Van Campenhout, B. 2007. Modeling trends in food market integration: Method and an application to Tanzanian 
maize markets. Food Policy 32:112–127. 
von Braun, J., A. Ahmed, K. Asenso-Okyere, S. Fan, A. Gulati, J. Hoddinott, R. Pandya-Lorch, M. W. Rosegrant, 
M. Ruel, M. Torero, T. van Rheenen, and K. von Grebmer. 2008. High food prices: The what, who, and 
how of proposed policy actions. Policy Brief. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research 
Institute. <http://www.ifpri.org/PUBS/ib/foodprices.asp>. Accessed June 29, 2009. 
World Bank. 2007.  Explaining sources of food price inflation in Ethiopia. “Just-in-time” Policy Note. Prepared by 
World Bank staff.  June 30, 2007.  
World Bank. 2008a. World development indicators database. Washington, D.C. <http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators>. Accessed September 5, 2008. 
World Bank. 2008b. World development report: Agriculture for development. Washington, D.C.   
RECENT IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
For earlier discussion papers, please go to http://www.ifpri.org/publications/results/taxonomy%3A468. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge. 
1058.  Fertilizer market situation: market structure, consumption and trade patterns, and pricing behavior. Manuel A. 
Hernandez and Maximo Torero, 2011. 
1057.  The wealth and gender distribution of rural services in Ethiopia: A public expenditure benefit incidence analysis. 
Tewodaj Mogues, Carly Petracco, and Josee Randriamamonjy, 2011. 
1056.  The gender implications of large-scale land deals. Julia Behrman, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Agnes Quisumbing, 2011. 
1055.  Impact of global change on large river basins: Example of the Yellow River basin. Nicola Cenacchi, Zongxue Xu, Wang 
Yu, Claudia Ringler, and Tingju Zhu, 2011. 
1054.  Strategic grain reserves in Ethiopia: Institutional design and operational performance. Shahidur Rashid and Solomon 
Lemma, 2011. 
1053.  Foreign aid to agriculture: Review of facts and analysis. Nurul Islam, 2011. 
1052.  Impacts of global change on the Nile Basin: Options for hydropolitical reform in Egypt and Ethiopia. Anja Kristina 
Martens, 2011. 
1051.  Estimating the role of spatial varietal diversity on crop productivity within an abatement framework: The case of banana 
in Uganda. Norman Kwikiriza, Enid Katungi, and Daniela Horna, 2011. 
1050.  Strengthening innovation capacity of Nigerian agricultural research organizations. Catherine Ragasa, Suresh Babu, 
Aliyu Sabi Abdullahi, and Baba Yusuf Abubakar, 2010. 
1049.  Asset dynamics in northern Nigeria. Andrew Dillon and Esteban J. Quiñones, 2010. 
1048.  Review of agricultural extension in India: Are farmers’ information needs being met? Claire J. Glendenning, Suresh 
Babu, and Kwadwo Asenso-Okyere, 2010. 
1047.  Recent findings on trade and inequality. Ann Harrison, John McLaren, and Margaret S. McMillan, 2010. 
1046.  An analysis of institutions and policy processes for selected antipoverty interventions in Bangladesh. Akhter U. Ahmed 
and Mubina Khondkar, 2010. 
1045.  Clustering as an organizational response to capital market inefficiency: Evidence from handloom enterprises in Ethiopia. 
Merima Ali, Jack Peerlings, and Xiaobo Zhang, 2010. 
1044.  Access to improved water source and satisfaction with services: Evidence from rural Ethiopia. Degnet Abebaw, Fanaye 
Tadesse, and Tewodaj Mogues, 2010. 
1043.  Valuing the environment in developing countries: Modeling the impact of distrust in public authorities’ ability to deliver 
public services on the citizens’ willingness to pay for improved environmental quality. Ekin Birol and Sukanya Das, 2010. 
1042.  Climate change impacts on food security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Insights from comprehensive climate change scenarios. 
Claudia Ringler, Tingju Zhu, Ximing Cai, Jawoo Koo, and Dingbao Wang, 2010. 
1041.  In-depth assessment of the public agricultural extension system of Ethiopia and recommendations for improvement. 
Kristin Davis, Burton Swanson, David Amudavi, Daniel Ayalew Mekonnen, Aaron Flohrs, Jens Riese, Chloe Lamb, and 
Elias Zerfu, 2010. 
1040.  Do geese migrate domestically? Evidence from the Chinese textile and apparel industry. Ruan Jianqing and Xiaobo 
Zhang, 2010. 
1039.  In pursuit of votes: The capture of the allocation of local public goods by the central state in Ghana. Leah Horowitz and 
Nethra Palaniswamy, 2010. 
1038.  An econometric investigation of impacts of sustainable land management practices on soil carbon and yield risk: A 
potential for climate change mitigation. Edward Kato, Ephraim Nkonya, Frank Place, and Majaliwa Mwanjalolo, 2010. 
1037.  Effects of inclusive public agricultural extension service: Results from a policy reform experiment in Western China. 
Ruifa Hu, Yaqing Cai, Kevin Z. Chen, Yongwei Cui, and Jikun Huang, 2010.  




2033 K Street, NW 




IFPRI ADDIS ABABA 
P. O. Box 5689 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Tel.: + 251 (0) 11-617-2500  




IFPRI NEW DELHI 
CG Block, NASC Complex, PUSA 
New Delhi 110-012 India 
Tel.: 91 11 2584-6565 




Airport Residential Area, Accra 
PMB CT 112 Cantonments,  
Accra, Ghana 
Tel.: +233 (0) 21 780-716  
Fax: +233 (0) 21 784-752   
 